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UNION PACIFIC/SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
MERGER: IMPACT ON SHIPPERS
Paul D. Larson 
University of Nevada-Reno
H. Barry Spraggins 
University of Nevada-Reno
In the Summer of ‘96, Union Pacific Railroad merged with Southern Pacific to create the largest 
American railroad. Controversy continues to surround the merger. This paper reports results of 
a recent merger-impact survey. Survey respondents were rail and intermodal shippers. Among 
the interesting research findings are the following: (1) while shippers report a negative impact due 
to less rail competition, trackage rights granted to Burlington Northern/Santa Fe have failed to 
dampen this impact; (2) railroad service has deteriorated, but freight rates have remained stable; 
and (3) service problems are more severe for rail, as opposed to TOFC/COFC, shippers.
INTRODUCTION
Since merging with Southern Pacific, Union 
Pacific Railroad has been in the news. 
Headlines, such as “Union Pacific Says its 
Network Jammed” and “Local Businesses 
Steamed over Union Pacific Backlog,” tell a 
tale of congested rail yards, late shipments, 
missing rail cars, neglected customers and 
overall poor service. As “Union Pacific’s 
Problems Continue,” other headlines, like 
“Union Pacific Faces Undoing Part of Merger” 
and “Union Pacific Reports to Feds on Sendee 
Meltdown,” suggest shipper and federal 
responses to post-merger sendee problems. 
These responses have included diversion of 
traffic to motor carriers and requiring 
submission of wreekly sendee reports to the U. 
S. government, as wrell as talk of dismantling 
the merger, opening up access to UP tracks,
and even railroad re-regulation. Some 
shippers are also laying their own tracks 
(Machalaba 1998a).
The purpose of this paper is to report results of 
a recent survey of shippers on the UP/SP 
railroad merger. The second and third sections 
briefly describe the merger and market area 
suneyed-Reno/Sparks, Nevada. Then, the 
fourth and fifth sections outline research 
methods and present statistical results, 
respectively. Finally, the paper closes with a 
discussion on implications of the results for 
transportation management.
The Merger
Union Pacific (UP) has sought control of 
Southern Pacific (SP) since the dawm of this 
century. In 1901, UP gained financial control of
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the Southern Pacific holding company which, in 
turn, had control of both SP and the Central 
Pacific (CP) railroads. (On May 10, 1869, UP 
and CP linked together near Ogden, Utah to 
form the first transcontinental railroad in 
North America.) But, in 1912, the U.S. 
Supreme Court instructed UP to relinquish its 
46 percent stake in SP. SP and CP merged in 
1959 (Wilner 1997).
On July 3, 1996, the Surface Transportation 
Board (STB) approved the UP/SP railroad 
merger. This made UP the largest railroad in 
the USA, with over 31,000 miles of track in 25 
states. UP and Burlington Northern/Santa Fe 
(BNSF) now control 90 percent of all rail 
freight in the West. STB approval of the 
merger came with conditions. One potentially 
important condition for shippers involves the 
trackage rights granted to BNSF on all “two-to- 
one” lanes, i.e. lanes formerly served by both 
UP and SP (Burke 1996).
Despite STB conditions, the merger was 
opposed by several groups, including the 
National Industrial Transportation League 
(NITL). The N1TL is the nation’s largest 
shipper group. According to Bradley (1995): 
“Shippers worry that the (UP/SP) merger will 
lead to reduced service-partly as a result of 
possible line abandon-ments--and higher 
rates.” The merger was also opposed by the 
Coalition for Competitive Rail Transportation 
and the United States Justice Department.
Before the merger, UP and SP operated a large 
number of parallel lines. The consolidation of 
parallel lines under one railroad affords an 
opportunity to route faster intermodal trains 
over one line and slower (e.g. coal) trains over 
the other (Bradley 1997). Indeed, the UP/SP 
merger application promised shippers faster 
TOFC/COFC movement between Chicago and 
both Northern and Southern California (Wilner
1997). Faster movement of freight is a form of 
improved service to shippers.
Consolidation of parallel lines, creating two-to- 
one lanes, can also eliminate competition and 
reduce incentives the remaining railroad has to 
improve its service to shippers. In the UP/SP 
merger, there were more than 130 two-to-one 
points (Wilner 1998). This concern-that a 
parallel or side-by-side merger will eliminate 
competition and result in worse service--has 
been confirmed in a prior shipper survey 
(Anon. 1978).
Reno/Sparks
The railroad created Reno, Nevada. CP 
entered Northern Nevada from the West in 
early 1868. Since the transcontinental railroad 
was to be routed along the Truckee River, 
towns such as Reno and Verdi emerged in the 
Spring of 1868 (Miluck 1994).
Recently, the railroad has been a source of 
controversy in Reno. Due to the UP/SP merger, 
the number of freight trains rolling through 
downtown Reno is expected to increase from 
14 to 25 per day. To handle increased 
congestion at RR crossings, the federal 
government recommends speeding up trains 
through Reno, from 20 to 30 mph (Voyles 
1998a). On the other hand, the Reno City 
Council wants to keep the trains moving at 20 
mph. The Council also wants UP to pay Si00 
million toward lowering the tracks into a 
trench under downtown Reno (Voyles 1998b).
Reno-area rail shippers have also been in the 
news recently. Shippers across a variety of 
industries--from automobiles to utilities to 
building supplies, for instance--have reported 
service problems with UP, the only (rail) show 
in town. An auto dealer complains about a 
shipment of 50 new cars being ten days late-- 
and counting. The regional power company is
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down to an 18-day supply of coal, but a 30 to 40- 
day supply is desired. A building supply 
wholesaler reports three to four week delivery 
delays on incoming materials. Shippers that 
have alternatives are starting to shift freight to 
trucks and/or work with BNSF (Henderson 
1997).
The Reno/Sparks market area is fertile ground 
for understanding the impact of the UP/SP 
merger on rail and intermodal shippers. The 
two former railroads linked up at Reno, due to 
the old UP branch line North of town. 
Moreover, each railroad had an intermodal 
terminal in the area, and there are a variety of 
rail and intermodal shippers in Northern 
Nevada. In short, the merger made Reno, “the 
biggest little city in the world,” a two-to-one 
point.
RESEARCH METHODS
Survey data were collected by telephone, and 
primarily analyzed using t-tests. A list of likely 
Northern Nevada rail and inter-modal shippers 
was developed, through consultation with 
Reno-area logistics and transportation 
professionals. This list was given to a research 
bureau at a major University in the West. 
Bureau staff performed the telephone survey, 
which lasted approximately ten minutes per 
completed call. The first survey question asked 
shippers to estimate the percent of their 
inbound and outbound freight (by weight) 
moved by each of the following modes: TOFC/ 
COFC, rail, truckload, less-than-truckload 
(LTL) and “other.” If the percent of 
TOFC/COFC plus rail freight was zero, for both 
inbound and outbound movement, the shipper 
was thanked and spared further questioning. 
Bureau staff completed surveys with over 30 
shippers, representingan estimated 80 percent 
of rail and inter-modal freight moving into and 
out of the Reno/Sparks area.
The survey included questions on rail 
transportation sendee and overall logistics 
performance, before and after the merger. 
Transportation service attributes were drawn 
from the literature, e.g. Coyle and colleagues 
(1994). Additional questions probe the 
expected impact of merger-related changes, 
such as abandonment of a branch line North of 
Reno, BNSF trackage rights, and closing of one 
intermodal facility.
STATISTICAL RESULTS
Overall Impact of Merger-related Changes
Table 1 reveals the overall impact of certain 
merger-related changes on shipper operations. 
On average, shippers perceive the impact of 
BNSF trackage rights over UP/SP lines to be 
slightly positive—but not statistically 
significant. While the impact of closing the 
intermodal (TOFC/COFC) facility in North 
Reno is perceived to be negative, this impact is 
also not statistically significant (at alpha < 
.05). A second TOFC/COFC terminal, in 
Sparks, remains open to serve intermodal 
shippers.
However, the impact of abandonment of the UP 
branch line from Reno-Stead North to 
Hallelujah Junction, California, is perceived to 
be negative (t = -2.99) and significant (p-value 
= .003). Prior to the merger, this branch line 
was UP’s sole path to Reno. Western Pacific 
(WP) ran this branch line North from Reno to 
Hallelujah Junction until 1982, w hen UP gained 
control of both Missouri Pacific (MP) and WT 
(Tardy 1998; Wilner 1997).
The impact of reduced railroad competition, 
due to the merger, is also perceived by 
Northern Nevada rail shippers to be negative (t 
= -5.22) and significant (p-value = .000). This 
result confirms the findings of a 1978Railway
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TABLE 1
IMPACT OF MERGER-RELATED CHANGES ON OPERATIONS*
Change Average Impact t p-value
BN/SF Trackage Rights .03 .44 .332
Closing of Intermodal Facility -.21 -1.65 .055
Branch Line Abandonment -.48 -2.99 .003
Less Rail Competition -.79 -5.22 .000
* scaled from -2 (very negative) to 2 (very positive), with 0 = no impact.
Age shipper survey on rail mergers. Only 3 
percent of respondents to that survey favored 
operating in a region served by a single 
railroad, and the other 97 percent opposed 
such an arrangement (Anon. 1978).
Impact of Merger on Logistics Performance
Table 2 shows shipper perceptions of rail 
freight performance changes, before and after 
the merger. Performance is measured in terms 
of freight rates, service availability, transit 
time, on-time delivery and total logistics costs. 
A recent Mercer survey of shippers reports that 
“timeliness” (transit time and on-time delivery) 
are especially important to intermodal shippers 
(Anon. 1996).
Shippers responding to the current survey 
indicated that freight rates are slightly worse 
(i.e. higher) after the merger, but the change is 
not statistically significant (see Table 2). 
However, railroad performance is reported to 
have deteriorated on all of the other measures, 
as follows: service availability (t = -3.77), 
transit time (t = -5.11), on-time delivery (t = - 
7.10) and total logistics costs (t = -3.42). It is 
interesting to note that total logistics costs of 
moving freight via rail have increased--even 
though freight rates have not. Apparently, 
shippers are feeling the cost impact of poor 
service. A lack of timeliness means higher 




Measure Average Change t p-value
Freight Rates -.03 -.37 .356
Service Availability -.66 -3.77 .001
Transit Time -.97 -5.11 .000
On-time Delivery -1.17 -7.10 .000
Total Logistics -.55 -3.42
Costs
* scaled from -2 (much worse) to 2 (much better), with 0 = same.
.001
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TABLE 3
UP/SP PERFORMANCE: BEFORE & AFTER THE MERGER
Performance Factor








The survey also asked shippers to estimate 
average transit time (days) and on-time 
delivery (percent) provided by the railroad, 
before and after the merger. These results are 
presented in Table 3. Note that average transit 
time has more than doubled, from 8.6 to 17.8 
days, since the UP/SP merger. As transit time 
doubles, so does in-transit or pipeline stock. 
Moreover, percent of deliveries on-time has 
fallen from 88.1 to 50.8 percent. Reduced 
delivery reliability implies higher destination 
safety stock.
Shipper Reactions to the Merger
As shippers perceive a lack of rail competition- 
-and a decline in service levels--one reasonable 
reaction is to divert traffic from railroad to 
motor carrier. Bearth (1997) reports an 
increase in freight diversion, from rail and 
intermodal to truck, especially due to the UP 
situation. The survey asked shippers to 
estimate the percent of rail and TOFC/COFC 
traffic (by weight) diverted to truck since the 
merger. These Reno-area shippers have 
diverted an average of 9.8 percent of their 
traffic to motor carrier. The percent of traffic 
diverted ranged from 0 to 48 percent.
A more extreme reaction is to advocate 
dismantling the merger. Machalaba (1998b) 
asserts that momentum toward an 
unprecedented partial dismantling of the 
UP/SP merger has been building. The survey 
asked shippers: “Do you believe the UP/SP 
merger should be dismantled?” While 59
percent of the respondents replied “no” to this 
question, 24 percent said “yes.” The remaining 
17 percent expressed no opinion. An open- 
ended follow-up question simply asked 
shippers “why” they replied yes or no to the 
dismantling question.
Reasons given by the yes (dismantle) group 
include:
“it (UP) is a monopoly now, employees are 
extremely rude”
“no competition, merger is disastrous” 
“poor management, unprepared, not being 
corrected”
“service was better when they (UP and SP) 
were separate”
- “lack of competition has raised prices”
Among the reasons given by the no group were 
the following:
“don’t think it (dismantling) would change 
anything”
“merger itself is not the problem”
“it would be more of a mess than it is now”
“(they, i.e. UP) just need to improve 
service”
- “what alternative is there?”
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Impact of Merger on Intermodal vs. Rail 
Shippers
Table 4 compares the merger impact on 
intermodal (TOFC/COFC) vs. rail shippers. 
The Mercer shipper survey found 48 percent of 
its respondents agreeing that rail mergers will 
make TOFC/COFC more attractive (Anon. 
1996). Unfortunately, according to Thomas
(1998), service problems at UP are stunting 
intermodal's growth. UP handles a substantial 
share of the intermodal volume in the USA. 
Since most TOFC/COFC shippers can switch to 
motor carriers with relative ease (Greenfield
1998), negative impacts of the merger should 
be stronger for rail—rather than 
intermodal—shippers. Rail shippers tend to be 
more captive.
TABLE 4
IMPACT OF MERGER ON INTERMODAL VS. RAIL SHIPPERS
Impact Itema Intermodal Shippers Rail Shippers t p-value
Closing of Intermodal Facility -.18 -.22 .15b .440
Branch Line Abandonment -.09 -.72 2.27° .016
On-time Delivery -.73 -1.44 2.26b .016
Transit Time -.45 -1.28 1.96c .036
aFor closing facility and line abandonment, impact is scaled from -2 (very negative) to 2 (very 
positive), with 0 = no impact. For on-time delivery and transit time, impact is scaled with -2 (much 
worse) to 2 (much better), with 0 = same.
‘ t-statistic based on pooled variances 
Ct-statistic based on separate variances
The difference between intermodal and rail 
shippers’ perceptions on the impact of closing 
the North Reno TOFC/COFC terminal are not 
statistically significant. Both groups expressed 
a modest, negative impact (see Table 4). On 
the other hand, the negative impact of 
abandonment of the North-bound branch line is 
stronger for rail shippers, as opposed to 
intermodal shippers. The difference between 
the two groups (t = 2.27; p-value = .016) is 
significant at the .05 level.
Post-merger railroad performance, in terms of 
on-time delivery and transit time, declined for 
both intermodal and rail shippers. However, 
rail shippers report a greater service slide, 
compared to TOFC/COFC shippers, on both on- 
time delivery (-1.44 vs. -.73) and transit time (- 
1.28 vs. -.45). Table 4 shows that these 
differences are statistically significant. It
appears that UP is doing a better job serving 
its intermodal customers, as opposed to its rail 
customers. Still, the merger hardly seems to be 
making intermodal transportation more 
attractive for shippers.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION 
MANAGEMENT
This section combines implications of the 
results for carriers (e.g. UP) and government 
agencies (e.g. the STB), since both are involved 
in transportation management.
It must be noted that the results are based on 
a relatively small sample of shippers in one 
area of the West (Northern Nevada). Further 
research is needed to expand investigation of 
the merger impact, by including a larger, more 
geographically diverse group of shippers
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The results compel a person to question 
conventional wisdom on trackage rights, as 
conditions for STB approval of rail mergers. 
Trackage rights are supposed to assuage 
shipper concerns about less rail competition, 
especially at two-to-one points like 
Reno/Sparks. However, shippers respondingto 
the survey felt quite concerned about reduced 
rail competition since the UP/SP 
merger—despite trackage rights granted to 
BNSF. Survey results also suggest that a 
railroad can close one TOFC/COFC terminal 
(for consolidation purposes), without upsetting 
shippers, as long as a second terminal remains 
open.
There are two main reasons shippers may fear 
two-to-one points and less rail competition: 
higher rates and wrorse service. It is nteresting 
o note that shippers participating in this survey 
reported a general deterioration of service 
since the merger, but no significant ncrease in 
freight rates. It seems UP is not using its 
monopoly situation in Northern Nevada to raise 
rates. Or, perhaps UP’s sendee problems are 
not all merger-related. As one expert observes, 
even before the merger, Union Pacific was 
experiencing “unprecedented problems with 
sendee” (Welty 1995).
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